Section one: Contracting authority/entity
one.1) Name and addresses
Ministry of Defence
Defence Equipment & Support, Abbey Wood
Bristol
Contact
Chris Bartlett
christopher.bartlett107@mod.gov.uk
Country
United Kingdom
NUTS code
UKK11 - Bristol, City of
Internet address(es)
Main address
one.4) Type of the contracting authority
Ministry or any other national or federal authority
one.5) Main activity
Defence
Section two: Object
two.1) Scope of the procurement
two.1.1) Title
Radar Data Replicator
two.1.2) Main CPV code
- 35722000 - Radar
two.1.3) Type of contract
Supplies
two.1.4) Short description
The Joint Sensors and Engagement Networks Delivery Team (JSENS DT), part of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), intends to place a contract with IBM UK Limited (the Contractor) for the support of the Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment that will enable the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.
two.1.6) Information about lots
This contract is divided into lots: No
two.1.7) Total value of the procurement (excluding VAT)
Value excluding VAT: £800,000
two.2) Description
two.2.3) Place of performance
NUTS codes
- UKJ31 - Portsmouth
two.2.4) Description of the procurement
The Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment will enable the UK’s Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.
two.2.5) Award criteria
Price
two.2.11) Information about options
Options: No
two.2.13) Information about European Union Funds
The procurement is related to a project and/or programme financed by European Union funds: No
Section four. Procedure
four.1) Description
four.1.1) Type of procedure
Negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice
- The products involved are manufactured purely for the purpose of research, experiment, study or development
- The works, supplies or services can be provided only by a particular economic operator for the following reason:
- absence of competition for technical reasons
Explanation:
It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons.
The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system ) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it’s safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA.
In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.
four.1.8) Information about the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
The procurement is covered by the Government Procurement Agreement: No
Section five. Award of contract/concession
A contract/lot is awarded: Yes
five.2) Award of contract/concession
five.2.1) Date of conclusion of the contract
26 November 2021
five.2.2) Information about tenders
The contract has been awarded to a group of economic operators: No
five.2.3) Name and address of the contractor/concessionaire
IBM United Kingdom Ltd
Portsmouth
Country
United Kingdom
NUTS code
- UKJ31 - Portsmouth
The contractor/concessionaire is an SME
No
five.2.4) Information on value of contract/lot/concession (excluding VAT)
Total value of the contract/lot/concession: £800,000
five.2.5) Information about subcontracting
The contract/lot/concession is likely to be subcontracted
Section six. Complementary information
six.3) Additional information
It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons.
The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system ) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it’s safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA.
In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.
six.4) Procedures for review
six.4.1) Review body
Ministry of Defence
Abbey Wood
Bristol
BS34 8JH
Country
United Kingdom