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Award

## **Radar Data Replicator**

Ministry of Defence

F15: Voluntary ex ante transparency notice

Notice identifier: 2021/S 000-029508

Procurement identifier (OCID): ocds-h6vhtk-02fab3

Published 26 November 2021, 10:45pm

### **Section I: Contracting authority/entity**

#### **I.1) Name and addresses**

Ministry of Defence

Defence Equipment & Support, Abbey Wood

Bristol

#### **Contact**

Chris Bartlett

#### **Email**

[christopher.bartlett107@mod.gov.uk](mailto:christopher.bartlett107@mod.gov.uk)

#### **Country**

United Kingdom

#### **NUTS code**

UKK11 - Bristol, City of

**Internet address(es)**

Main address

[www.des.mod.uk](http://www.des.mod.uk)

**I.4) Type of the contracting authority**

Ministry or any other national or federal authority

**I.5) Main activity**

Defence

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**Section II: Object****II.1) Scope of the procurement****II.1.1) Title**

Radar Data Replicator

**II.1.2) Main CPV code**

- 35722000 - Radar

**II.1.3) Type of contract**

Supplies

**II.1.4) Short description**

The Joint Sensors and Engagement Networks Delivery Team (JSENS DT), part of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), intends to place a contract with IBM UK Limited (the Contractor) for the support of the Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment that will enable the UK's Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

**II.1.6) Information about lots**

This contract is divided into lots: No

**II.1.7) Total value of the procurement (excluding VAT)**

Value excluding VAT: £800,000

## **II.2) Description**

### **II.2.3) Place of performance**

NUTS codes

- UKJ31 - Portsmouth

### **II.2.4) Description of the procurement**

The Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment will enable the UK's Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

### **II.2.5) Award criteria**

Price

### **II.2.11) Information about options**

Options: No

### **II.2.13) Information about European Union Funds**

The procurement is related to a project and/or programme financed by European Union funds: No

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## **Section IV. Procedure**

### **IV.1) Description**

#### **IV.1.1) Type of procedure**

Negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice

- The products involved are manufactured purely for the purpose of research, experiment, study or development
- The works, supplies or services can be provided only by a particular economic operator for the following reason:

- absence of competition for technical reasons

**Explanation:**

It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons.

The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system ) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it's safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA.

In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.

**IV.1.8) Information about the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)**

The procurement is covered by the Government Procurement Agreement: No

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## **Section V. Award of contract/concession**

A contract/lot is awarded: Yes

### **V.2) Award of contract/concession**

#### **V.2.1) Date of conclusion of the contract**

26 November 2021

#### **V.2.2) Information about tenders**

The contract has been awarded to a group of economic operators: No

#### **V.2.3) Name and address of the contractor/concessionaire**

IBM United Kingdom Ltd

Portsmouth

Country

United Kingdom

NUTS code

- UKJ31 - Portsmouth

The contractor/concessionaire is an SME

No

#### **V.2.4) Information on value of contract/lot/concession (excluding VAT)**

Total value of the contract/lot/concession: £800,000

#### **V.2.5) Information about subcontracting**

The contract/lot/concession is likely to be subcontracted

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## **Section VI. Complementary information**

### **VI.3) Additional information**

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### **VI.4) Procedures for review**

#### **VI.4.1) Review body**

Ministry of Defence

Abbey Wood

Bristol

BS34 8JH

Country

United Kingdom

