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Award

Radar Data Replicator

Ministry of Defence

F15: Voluntary ex ante transparency notice

Notice identifier: 2021/S 000-029508

Procurement identifier (OCID): ocds-h6vhtk-02fab3

Published 26 November 2021, 10:45pm

Section I: Contracting authority/entity

I.1) Name and addresses

Ministry of Defence

Defence Equipment & Support, Abbey Wood

Bristol

Contact

Chris Bartlett

Email

christopher.bartlett107@mod.gov.uk

Country

United Kingdom

NUTS code

UKK11 - Bristol, City of

Internet address(es)

Main address

www.des.mod.uk

I.4) Type of the contracting authority

Ministry or any other national or federal authority

I.5) Main activity

Defence

Section II: Object**II.1) Scope of the procurement****II.1.1) Title**

Radar Data Replicator

II.1.2) Main CPV code

- 35722000 - Radar

II.1.3) Type of contract

Supplies

II.1.4) Short description

The Joint Sensors and Engagement Networks Delivery Team (JSENS DT), part of the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), intends to place a contract with IBM UK Limited (the Contractor) for the support of the Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment that will enable the UK's Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

II.1.6) Information about lots

This contract is divided into lots: No

II.1.7) Total value of the procurement (excluding VAT)

Value excluding VAT: £800,000

II.2) Description

II.2.3) Place of performance

NUTS codes

- UKJ31 - Portsmouth

II.2.4) Description of the procurement

The Radar Data Replicator (RDR) equipment will enable the UK's Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) system, to access and receive radar plot and strobe data from primary Air Defence Radars without impacting the IBM delivered Command and Control System (CCS) which is the primary user of these data feeds.

II.2.5) Award criteria

Price

II.2.11) Information about options

Options: No

II.2.13) Information about European Union Funds

The procurement is related to a project and/or programme financed by European Union funds: No

Section IV. Procedure

IV.1) Description

IV.1.1) Type of procedure

Negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice

- The products involved are manufactured purely for the purpose of research, experiment, study or development
- The works, supplies or services can be provided only by a particular economic operator for the following reason:

- absence of competition for technical reasons

Explanation:

It is considered that this requirement can be awarded using the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice pursuant to Article 28(1)(e) of Directive 2009/81/EC (Regulation 16(1)(a)(ii) of the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011) for technical reasons.

The Contractor is the only entity able to safely deliver this requirement. Using a different supplier to support the above equipment will introduce an intolerable level of safety risk directly to the IBM Command and Control System (CCS) Safety Case and also to the overarching ASACS (Air Surveillance and control system) System Safety Case. The Contractor is the MOD Safety Case holder and will be required to consider and sign off hazards and risks introduced by this system at their external interface as the capability will be required to physically connect directly to the IBM CCS in addition to the GBAD system. In addition, the capability will form part of the wider ASACS System, and so it's safety case will also need to form part of the overarching ASACS system safety case. Both the CCS and ASACS safety cases must follow the mandated policy and guidance of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Articles and will be audited for compliance with these regulations by the MAA.

In order to retain the security integrity of the end to end data provided to the MOD Command and Control System, it is technically impractical for anyone other than the Contractor to provide this requirement. Any alternative supplier would lead to an unacceptable level of security accreditation risk being placed on this assured data service within the ASACS system.

IV.1.8) Information about the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)

The procurement is covered by the Government Procurement Agreement: No

Section V. Award of contract/concession

A contract/lot is awarded: Yes

V.2) Award of contract/concession

V.2.1) Date of conclusion of the contract

26 November 2021

V.2.2) Information about tenders

The contract has been awarded to a group of economic operators: No

V.2.3) Name and address of the contractor/concessionaire

IBM United Kingdom Ltd

Portsmouth

Country

United Kingdom

NUTS code

- UKJ31 - Portsmouth

The contractor/concessionaire is an SME

No

V.2.4) Information on value of contract/lot/concession (excluding VAT)

Total value of the contract/lot/concession: £800,000

V.2.5) Information about subcontracting

The contract/lot/concession is likely to be subcontracted

Section VI. Complementary information

VI.3) Additional information

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VI.4) Procedures for review

VI.4.1) Review body

Ministry of Defence

Abbey Wood

Bristol

BS34 8JH

Country

United Kingdom

